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The year 2004 witnessed a vast outpouring of scholarship celebrating and
analyzing the fiftieth anniversary of the Supreme Court's decision in Brown
v. Board of Education.' The magnitude of this literature reflects the impact
of Brown not only on the development of constitutional jurisprudence, but
also on the overall pattern of race relations in America. By holding that state-
mandated segregation in schools violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court brought an end to the American system of
official racial apartheid and set in motion a series of events that have
dramatically altered the relationship between whites and African-Americans
in our society more generally. Thus, the scope of the reaction to the
anniversary of the decision was entirely predictable and understandable.
The attention lavished on Brown stands in marked contrast to the treatment
of Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States,2 which was handed down less than
a year later. The context in which Tee-Hit-Ton was decided was in many
ways analogous to that of Brown itself. Like Brown, Tee-Hit-Ton profoundly
effected the rights of a racial minority that had suffered greatly at the hands
of the white majority - in this case, Native Americans. Moreover, during the
late nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries, the Court had shown no
more sympathy for the plight of Native Americans than it had for African-
Americans. However, the ultimate result in Tee-Hit-Ton could not have been
more different than that in Brown. Rather than breaking new ground in
defense of Native American rights, the Court issued one of the most retrograde
Indian law decisions of the twentieth century - a decision that commentators
have argued is marked by "blatant racism,"3 and analogous to the Court's
infamous 1857 decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford.4
* Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers (Camden).
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see, e.g., Symposium, The Quest for Equal Opportunity: Brown
Turns 50, San Antonio Turns 30,52 AM. U. L. REV. 1341 (2003-2004); Symposium, Brown v.
Board of Education Revisited, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 224 (2004).
2. 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
3. Matthew L. M. Fletcher, Sawnawegezewog, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 35, 50 (2003); see
also Philip P. Frickey, Book Review, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1199, 1210 n.81 (1989) (Tee-Hit-Ton
decision marked by "implicit racism").
4. Joseph William Singer, Well-Settled?: The Increasing Weight of History In American
Indian Law Claims, 28 GA. L. REV. 481,484-85 (1994).
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The ironies inherent in the juxtaposition of Brown and Tee-Hit-Ton have
been ignored in the widespread discussions and celebrations that have
surrounded the fiftieth anniversary of Brown.5 Indeed, with the exception of
a small band of Property teachers and Indian law experts, few scholars take
any note of Tee-Hit-Ton at all; the case is typically ignored even in detailed
studies of the structure and impact of Warren Court jurisprudence generally. 6
This article, by contrast, will explore the lessons that can be learned from the
Court's disparate treatment of the two cases. The article will begin by briefly
recapitulating the events that ultimately led to the Brown decision. Next, the
article will outline the complex doctrinal background of Tee-Hit-Ton and
discuss the analysis of the Tee-Hit-Ton Court itself. Finally, the article will
describe the forces that led the Court to its very different conclusions in
Brown and Tee-Hit-Ton.
I. Brown v. Board of Education
The tale of Brown v. Board of Education is one of the best-known stories
in legal history. The story begins with the adoption of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Drafted by Northern Republicans in
response to what they viewed as the unwillingness of Southerners to accept
the full consequences of their defeat in the Civil War, the Amendment was
proposed by Congress in 1866 and ratified by the requisite number of states
in 1868.' The Equal Protection Clause was part of Section 1 of the
Amendment, which in turn was intended to guarantee at least a measure of
legal equality to African-Americans. Nonetheless, most commentators have
concluded that the framers of the Amendment did not have a specific intention
to outlaw racial segregation in the public schools.8 Many, however, have also
5. The juxtaposition is noted in passing in Nell Jessup Newton, At the Whim of the
Sovereign: Aboriginal Title Reconsidered, 31 HASTINGS L. J. 1215, 1247-48 (1979-80), and
Singer, supra note 4, at 483.
6. E.g., LUCAS A. PowE, THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000). Not
surprisingly, Tee-Hit-Ton has received much more attention from specialists in Indian law. The
most complete treatment of the background and impact of the case is Newton, supra note 5.
7. Much of the vast literature that discusses the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment is
cited and analyzed in EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS,
1863-1869 (1990) [hereinafter MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS] and EARL M. MALTZ, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (2003).
8. E.g., Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response
to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881 (1995); MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 7, at
109-13.
A notable exception is found at Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation
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argued that the language of the clause by its terms suggests a more general
commitment to a principle of equality that is broad enough to encompass a
requirement that the state not segregate its schools by race.9
Ultimately, of course, the Supreme Court was called upon to determine the
scope of the protections provided by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court's
first major pronouncement on the constitutionality of racial segregation came
in its 1896 decision in Plessy v. Ferguson.'I In Plessy, with only a single
dissent, the Court rejected a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a Louisiana
statute that required the operators of street railways to maintain separate but
equal facilities for white passengers and their African-American counterparts.
Speaking for the majority, Justice Henry B. Brown first rejected a Thirteenth
Amendment challenge to the statute, declaring that "[a] statute which implies
merely a legal distinction between the races.., has no tendency to destroy the
legal equality of the two races, or re-establish a state of involuntary
servitude."'1  Turning to the Fourteenth Amendment, Brown began by
sketching in general terms his vision of the reach of the Amendment:
The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the
absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature
of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions
based upon color... as distinguished from political equality, or a
commingling of the two races upon grounds unsatisfactory to
either. 12
The key question, of course, was how one was to define the phrase
"equality... before the law." In part, Brown's treatment of this issue reflected
the evolution of the Republican position on race during the Reconstruction
era. At the time the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted, many Republicans
drew a sharp distinction between civil rights and political rights, and the
drafters made a conscious decision not to directly protect political rights.1 3
For Justice Brown, by contrast, political equality was an essential element of
equality before the law, and he cited the jury discrimination struck down in
Strauder v. West Virginia4 as the classic example of a forbidden racial
Decisions, 81 VA. L. REv. 947 (1995).
9. E.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles andSome FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1 (1971).
10. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
11. Id. at 543.
12. Id. at 544.
13. See MALTZ, CiviL RIGHTS, supra note 7.
14. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 545 (discussing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879)).
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classification. Outside the area of political rights, however, Brown was far
more willing to countenance the use of race in government decision making.
He cited a series of state court cases that had upheld school segregation as
paradigms for the view that some racially-based laws did not violate
Fourteenth Amendment principles. 5
Having established the parameters of his analysis, Brown next turned to the
case law that had dealt specifically with the issue of segregation by common
carriers, concluding that the right of access to public conveyances did not
merit special constitutional protection. He then applied a rational basis test,
noting that "every exercise of the police power must be reasonable, and extend
only to such laws as are enacted... for the promotion of the public good, and
not for the annoyance or oppression of a particular class."' 16 Characterizing
the Louisiana statute as an appropriate measure to ensure "good order" and the
comfort of passengers of all races, Brown then proceeded to the most widely-
quoted portion of his opinion:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiffs argument to
consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two
races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be
so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely
because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon
it .... Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to
abolish distinctions based upon physical differences, and the
attempt to do so can only result in accentuating the difficulties of
the present situation. If the civil and political rights of both races
be equal one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or politically.
If one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the
United States cannot put them on the same plane. 7
Three years later, the Court addressed the specific issue of racial
segregation in schools in Cumming v. County Board of Education.18 In
Cumming, a group of African-American parents launched a Fourteenth
Amendment challenge to the use of their tax dollars to support a high school
15. The leading case in this line was Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198
(1849).
16. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550.
17. Id. at 551-52.
18. 175 U.S. 528 (1899). For a detailed discussion and analysis of Cumming, see J.
Morgan Kousser, Separate but Not Equal: The Supreme Court's First Decision on Racial




for whites where no analogous institution was provided for the education of
blacks. Speaking for a unanimous Court, Justice John Marshall Harlan, whose
dissent in Plessy has become justly famous, rejected the black parents'
contentions. The specific basis for his ruling was that even if there were a
Fourteenth Amendment violation in the allocation of funds, an injunction
which undermined the white school was not an appropriate remedy. 19 At the
same time, however the opinion seemed to implicitly approve the concept of
segregated schools2" and closed with this language:
[W]hile all admit that the benefits and burdens of public taxation
must be shared by citizens without discrimination... on account
of their race, the education of the people in schools maintained by
state taxation is a matter belonging to the respective States, and
any interference on the part of Federal authority with the
management of such schools cannot be justified except in the case
of a clear and unmistakable disregard of rights secured by the
supreme law of the land.2
If any doubt remained about the constitutionality of the practice of
maintaining segregated public schools, it was dispelled by the 1927 decision
in Gong Lum v. Rice.22 In Gong Lum, the state of Mississippi required the
daughter of a Chinese merchant to attend the public school for African-
Americans, rather than the school for whites. The Court unanimously rejected
an equal protection challenge to this decision. Citing Plessy, Cumming and
a variety of state court cases, Chief Justice William Howard Taft argued that
the case presented "the same question which has been many times decided to
be within the constitutional power of the state Legislature [sic] to settle"23 and
that while "[m]ost of the cases cited arose ... over the establishment of
separate schools as between white pupils and black pupils, but we cannot
think that the question is any different ... where the issue is as between white
pupils and pupils of the yellow races. 24
By its terms, the prevailing doctrine of the Plessy/Gong Lum era required
the states to provide equal facilities for whites and African-Americans.
Nonetheless, in practice, the school systems in states which mandated racial
19. Cumming, 175 U.S. at 544-45.
20. Id. at 545.
21. Id.
22. 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
23. Id. at 85-86 (citations omitted).
24. Id. at 87.
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segregation were both separate and unequal. Beginning in 1937 with Missouri
ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,5 a series of Supreme Court decisions involving law
schools clearly signaled that the Court was taking the requirement of equality
very seriously indeed.26 However, by its nature, attacks based on the theory
that the schools provided to African-Americans were inferior to those attended
by whites required laborious, case-by-case challenges to the specific
conditions that existed in each school system. Thus, those seeking to improve
educational opportunities for African-American children decided to mount an
assault on the basic principles that the Court had enunciated in Plessy. Brown
and its companion cases were the vehicles for that assault.
Brown was first argued before the Court during its October 1952 term. In
the conference that followed the argument, the justices split along geographic
lines. z7 Justices Felix Frankfurter of Massachusetts, William 0. Douglas of
Connecticut, Robert H. Jackson of New York, Harold H. Burton of Ohio, and
Sherman Minton of Indiana - all of whom were appointed from states that
had been free states at the outbreak of the Civil War - were apparently in
favor of overturning Plessy; among the free state justices, only Robert H.
Jackson appeared to be undecided. 8 Conversely, three of the four justices
from former slave states - Chief Justice Frederick M. Vinson of Missouri
and Justices Stanley F. Reed of Kentucky and Thomas C. Clark of Texas -
initially argued that Plessy should remain good law. Only Justice Hugo L.
Black crossed the regional divide and joined the Northerners in advocating the
abandonment of Plessy.
Even those justices who favored overruling Plessy recognized that such a
decision would engender great political upheaval in the South, and that the
scope of this upheaval would likely be magnified if the decision were not
25. 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
26. The cases included McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt
v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); and Sipuel v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 332
U.S. 631 (1948).
27. The internal deliberations of the Court in Brown are described in detail in RICHARD
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK
AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976) and MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO
CIvIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004).
28. Klarman suggests that Frankfurter was also undecided at this stage. KLARMAN, supra
note 27, at 295. However, the evidence of the Court's internal proceedings is to the contrary.
Admittedly, Frankfurter had great difficulty in reconciling the ultimate result in Brown with
conventional legal analysis. However, his own conference notes describe the Court as divided
5-4 in favor of overruling Plessy, and Burton's notes describe a 6-3 split. KLUGER, supra note
27, at 614. Given that Jackson was clearly undecided at this point, the only plausible conclusion




unanimous. Hoping to find some way to compose their differences, they put
Brown over for re-argument, directing the attorneys on both sides to address
the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the interim,
Chief Justice Vinson died, and was replaced by Earl Warren of California.
Warren personally favored overruling Plessy, and after the re-argument Justice
Clark was convinced to join the majority. Reed was the final holdout;
however, cognizant of the desirability of unanimity and faced with the reality
that Plessy was going to be overruled in any event, he relented as well. Thus,
on May 17, 1954, Chief Justice Earl Warren announced that the Court had
concluded unanimously that the government could not allow public schools
to be segregated on the basis of race.
The price of unanimity was a nonaccusatory, bland opinion that focused
narrowly on the impact of segregated schools on African-American children.
Warren began by describing the discussions surrounding the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment as "inconclusive" on the question of whether the
maintenance of segregated schools was originally understood to be rendered
unconstitutional by the Equal Protection Clause. 29 He also argued that, in any
event, public schools had grown in importance in the intervening years,
declaring that "[tioday, education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments"3 and that "it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education."'" Citing modem studies which suggested that African-Americans
suffered psychological harm from being educated in a segregated
environment,32 Warren concluded that "in the field of public education the
doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities
are inherently unequal. 33
While the decision in Brown clearly outlawed racial segregation in schools
operated by state governments and their subdivisions, it did not directly
resolve the issue of segregation in the District of Columbia public schools.
These schools were operated by an institution of the federal government, and
by its terms the Equal Protection Clause applies only to the states. However,
from a political perspective, it would have been unthinkable to outlaw
segregation in the states and leave the federal government free to classify
29. Brown, 347 U.S. at 489.
30. Id. at 493.
31. Id.
32. Id. at494&n.11.
33. Id. at 495.
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students on the basis of race. Thus, in Boiling v. Sharpe,34 Warren concluded
that the maintenance of segregated schools was also prohibited by the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Given the reasoning of the Court in Brown, in theory the impact of the
decision might have been limited to the specific context of school segregation.
However, the Court soon made it clear that it viewed Brown as establishing
the principle that government-imposed racial segregation generally violated
the Equal Protection Clause, as well as the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause." Thus, although some have questioned its practical significance,36
Brown clearly stands as an important milestone in the struggle for racial
justice in America. Tee-Hit-Ton, by contrast, is a milestone of a quite
different sort.
II. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States
In Tee-Hit-Ton, the Court was called upon to resolve the constitutional
status of aboriginal title in land - title that Native Americans derived not
from treaties, but rather from their status as preexisting occupants of the
territory that became the United States. Even prior to the Tee-Hit-Ton
decision, the Court had consistently held that Congress had broad authority to
abrogate such claims, asserting that "[tihe power of Congress in that regard
is supreme. The manner, method and time of such extinguishment raise
political, not justiciable, issues."37 However, while the right of Congress to
extinguish aboriginal title was well established, the question of whether
Native Americans had a constitutional right to compensation for the extinction
of aboriginal title had not been clearly answered prior to 1955.
The issue came to the Tee-Hit-Ton Court against the background of a long
and complex series of doctrinal developments. The Court first directly
addressed the issue of Indian land rights in 1810, in Fletcher v. Peck.38 In
Fletcher, the state legislature of Georgia had conveyed to private parties a
large tract of land that was occupied by Indians.39 One of the grounds for
challenging the sale was based on the theory that the Indian tribes possessed
34. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
35. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv.L.REV.
1, 22 n.72 (1959).
36. E.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOw HOPE: CAN THE COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1993).
37. E.g., United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 347 (1941).





sufficient title to prevent the state of Georgia from holding a fee simple in the
property.4 ° Speaking for a majority of the Court, Chief Justice John Marshall
rejected this argument, concluding that "the nature of the Indian title, which
is certainly to be respected by all courts, until it be legitimately extinguished,
is not such as to be absolutely repugnant to seisin in fee on the part of the
state." Thus, although Marshall recognized the authority of the state
government to convey title in land occupied by Native Americans, the
language of the opinion strongly suggested that the grantee would take subject
to the interest inherent in aboriginal title.
In any event, the treatment of the Indian land claims in Fletcher was only
a prelude to the pivotal decision in Johnson and Graham's Lessee v.
M'Intosh.42 Johnson arose from a dispute over the title to a number of parcels
of land in southern Illinois and Indiana. The claims of the plaintiffs derived
from private purchases made directly by white land speculators from the
Illinois and Piankeshaw Indians in 1773 and 1775, respectively; at the time of
the transactions, such private purchases were forbidden by the British
Proclamation of 1763. 4" Subsequent to these purchases, after the victory of
the colonists in the Revolutionary War, the Indian tribes ceded the same land
to the United States government by treaty. The government had in turn sold
the land to the defendants in Johnson. The question in the case was which
claim had priority.
The theoretical difficulties in Johnson derived in large measure from the
somewhat ambiguous position of the right to acquire and convey real property
generally. On one hand, the right to own real property was characterized by
prominent authorities such as Sir William Blackstone and Emmerich de Vattel
as a natural right." On the other, it was closely related to membership in a
political community. Thus, in theory, under English law, title to all real
40. Id. at 142.
41. Id. at 142-43.
42. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). Important treatments of Johnson include ROBERT A.
WILLIAMS, THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF
CONQUEST (1992) and Eric Kades, History and Interpretation of the Great Case of Johnson v.
M'Intosh, 19 LAW & HIST. REV. 67 (2001).
43. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 564.
44. 1 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 138
(Sharswood ed., 1875); Emmerich de Vattel, Le droit des gens: ou, Principes de la loi naturelle
appliques a la conduite et aux affaires des nations et des souverains 194 (Oceana Publ'ns 1964)
(1758).
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property was ultimately traced to the Crown and, in general, noncitizens could
legitimately be denied the right to acquire such property.45
The problem in Johnson was that the case involved the rights of two
different entities claiming sovereign authority over the same parcels of land.
Of course, the rights of the United States were derived from their treaties with
the Illinois and Piankeshaw Indian tribes. However, if prior to the execution
of the treaties the Indian tribes had possessed full sovereign authority over the
land, then the prior conveyance to the land speculators would have priority
over the sale from the United States. Thus, Johnson necessarily raised the
question of which sovereign had ultimate authority over the land that was in
dispute.
The claim of the United States derived from the English assertion of
dominion over the land in question. As a theoretical matter, however, it was
far from clear why this claim should supercede the rights of the Indian tribe
as the original inhabitants of the land - a status which normally carried with
it a right to assert sovereign authority.46 Some early authorities had suggested
that, as "infidels," Indians lacked the capacity to exercise legally cognizable
sovereign rights over the land in which they lived.47 Vattel, a leading
jurisprude of the late eighteenth century, took a somewhat different tack in his
classic Law of Nations. He combined the doctrine that nations could validly
assert claims to land that they discovered with one of the most important
themes in the rhetoric of white supremacy - the superiority of a lifestyle and
economy based on agricultural life to one based upon hunting and fishing:
It is asked whether a Nation may lawfully occupy any part of a vast
territory in which are to be found only wandering tribes whose
small numbers cannot populate the whole country. [Because] of
the obligation of cultivating the earth.. . these tribes cannot take
to themselves more land than they have need of or can inhabit and
cultivate. Their uncertain occupancy of these vast regions can not
be held as a real and lawful taking of possession; and when the
Nations of Europe, which are too confined at home, come upon
lands which the savages have no special need of and are making no
present and continuous use of, they may lawfully take possession
of them and establish colonies in them.48
45. VATrEL, supra note 44, at 149.
46. Id. at 84-85; WILLIAMs, supra note 42, at 98-100.
47. WILLIAMS, supra note 42, at 209-11.




Whatever the theoretical merits of these arguments, their impact was
buttressed by important pragmatic considerations. What was at stake in
Johnson was no less than the ability of the United States government to
control and regularize the disposition of the territory over which it claimed
sovereignty. A decision granting priority to the land speculators' deed would
have created a regime under which the title to federal lands would have been
effectively controlled not by the federal government, but rather by the
numerous Indian tribes that had inhabited the land prior to the arrival of
European explorers.
Under these circumstances, it should be no surprise that the Supreme Court
ruled unanimously against the land speculators. Speaking for the Court, Chief
Justice Marshall relied in part on the fact that the original purchase from the
Indians had been invalid under the proclamation of 1763. 49 In addition,
however, he engaged in a wide-ranging analysis of the status of Indian titles
in the United States. Marshall began this analysis with a detailed account of
the chain of events which underlay the British claim of title to the Indian
lands.5° He then addressed the relationship between this claim and natural law
claims that supported the rights of the Indians themselves (and thus the claims
of the speculators). Marshall argued that the Supreme Court was in essence
a conduit for the sovereign authority of the government of the United States,
and as such was bound to vindicate the policies of that government, even in
the face of contrary natural law principles:
The United States... have unequivocally acceded to that great and
broad rule by which its civilized inhabitants now hold this country.
They hold, and assert in themselves, the title by which it was
acquired. They maintain.., that discovery gave an exclusive right
to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or
conquest.
We will not enter the into controversy, whether agriculturists,
merchants, and manufacturers have a right, on abstract principles,
to expel hunters from the territory they possess, or to contract their
limits.... The British government.., whose rights have passed to
the United States, asserted a title to all the lands occupied by
Indians, within the chartered limits of the British colonies.... It is
49. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 564.
50. Id. at 572-86.
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not for the Courts of this country to question the validity of this
title, or to sustain one which is incompatible with it.
51
One problem remained, however. Under widely accepted principles of
international law, conquerors generally recognized the private property rights
of conquered peoples, and incorporated them into their citizenry. 52 Marshall
was clearly cognizant of this problem and sought to deal with it by resorting
to the image of the Indians as savages whose way of life was incompatible
with European values:
53
[T]he tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages,
whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn
chiefly from the forest. To leave them in possession of their
country, was to leave the country a wilderness; to govern them as
a distinct people, was impossible, because they were as brave and
as high-spirited as they were fierce, and were ready to repel by
arms every attempt on their independence. 4
The two strands of Marshall's analysis came together in his ultimate
description of the status of Indian land titles:
However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of
an inhabited country into conquest may appear; if the principle has
been asserted in the first instance, and afterwards sustained; if a
country has been acquired and held under it; if the property of the
great mass of the community originates in it, it becomes the law of
the land, and cannot be questioned. So, too, with respect to the
concomitant principle, that the Indian inhabitants are to be
considered merely as occupants, to be protected, indeed, while in
peace in the possession of their lands, but to be deemed incapable
of transferring the absolute right to others. However this
restriction may be opposed to natural right, and to the usages of
civilized nations, yet, if it be indispensable to that system under
which the country has been settled, and be adapted to the actual
condition of the two people, it may, perhaps, be supported by
reason, and certainly cannot be rejected by Courts of justice.55
51. Id. at 587-89.
52. VArEL, supra note 44, at 309-11
53. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 589-90.
54. Id. at 590.




Obviously, Johnson was something less than a major victory for the
supporters of Indian land rights. However, Chief Justice Marshall did not
conclude that the legal rights of Native Americans had been totally
extinguished by the doctrine of discovery." Instead, he explicitly noted that
until the discoverer exercised its right "by purchase or by conquest," Indians
remained "the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim
to retain possession of it."57 In 1832, Marshall elaborated on the legal
significance of aboriginal title in Worcester v. Georgia.58
Worcester arose from an effort by the government of the state of Georgia
to assert its authority over the Cherokee Indians who were residing on a
reservation within the state's borders.59 In 1802, Georgia had ceded its claims
to western lands in return for the promise of the United States to extinguish
the Indian claims to land within its boundaries as soon as it could be done
"peaceably" and on "reasonable terms."' The Cherokees, however, with the
encouragement and aid of the federal government, had adopted farming in
place of hunting, and had become attached to their lands.6 They refused to
move. Moreover, in 1827 they adopted a constitution based on the United
States model and declared themselves an independent nation.62 In response,
the Georgia state legislature adopted a series of laws that placed the Cherokee
lands within the boundaries of several counties of the state and declared that
after June 1, 1830, Georgia law would be enforced in the area and that all
Indian customs and laws would be null and void.63 In addition, Indians were
denied the right to testify in cases involving whites, and whites were
prohibited from discouraging them from emigrating westward.'
The Cherokees first sought to maintain an action in their own name
challenging the constitutionality of the Georgia statutes.65 In Cherokee Nation
56. Id. at 583.
57. Id. at 574, 587 (emphasis added).
58. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
59. G. EDWARD WHITE, THEMARSHALLCOURTANDCULTURALCHANGE 1815-1835, at 716
(1988); see also JILL NORGEN, THE CHEROKEE CASES: THE CONFRONTATION OF LAW AND
POLMCS 115 (1995); Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics and
Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV 500 (1969) (detailed in descriptions and analysis of the factual and
political background of Worcester).




64. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 11 (1831).
65. WHITE, supra note 59, at 720.
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v. Georgia,6 6 Marshall spoke for a majority of the justices in concluding that
the Court lacked Article m1ljurisdiction over the suit. However, the following
term, in Worcester, the Court was faced with an appeal by a white missionary
who had been convicted for violating the Georgia law which prohibited white
men from residing in Cherokee territory without a license from the state.67 In
this procedural posture, Worcester did not present the Article I problems that
had characterized Cherokee Nation. Moreover, as a clear invocation of
personal right, the case could not be characterized as involving purely political
questions. Thus, a decision on the merits became inevitable.
Once again speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall concluded that
the Georgia statute was unconstitutional.68 Worcester is best known for
holding that only Congress possessed authority to regulate Indian tribes.69 In
rejecting the state of Georgia's argument, however, Marshall was forced to
confront the claim that Georgia possessed sovereignty over the Indian lands
because, under the doctrine of discovery, the Cherokees had no legally
cognizable property interest in the land that they occupied.7° Rejecting this
claim, Marshall emphasized the legal significance of the aboriginal title that
had been recognized in Johnson, asserting that the doctrine of discovery
"regulated the right ... among the [E]uropean discoverers; but could not
affect the right of those already in possession ... as aboriginal occupants..
. It gave the exclusive right to purchase [to the discoverer], but did not found
that right on a denial of the right of the possessor to sell."'"
In 1835, the Marshall Court once again focused on the status of aboriginal
title in Mitchel v. United States.72 In Mitchel, an English mercantile house had
purchased large amounts of property from the Seminole Indian tribe in
Florida.73 The purchase was made with the permission of the Spanish
government, which was at that time generally recognized as the ruler of
Florida.74 Subsequently, Florida was ceded to the United States in the Adams-
Onis Treaty of 1819. The United States claimed that the rights that it had
66. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
67. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 537.
68. Id. at 562.
69. Id. at 561.
70. Id. at 542-57.
71. Id. at 544.
72. 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 (1835); see also David E. Wilkins, Johnson v. M' Intosh Revisited:
Through the Eyes of Mitchel v. United States, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 171 (1994) (for a
comprehensive treatment of Mitchel).





acquired by the treaty superceded the claim of the successors to the purchaser
from the Seminole tribe. 5 The Court unanimously held that the claim of the
original purchasers had precedence.76
The fact that the purchasers had acted with the blessing of the Spanish
government loomed large in the Court's disposition of Mitchel. Nonetheless,
the opinion of the Court is notable for its emphasis on the significance of
aboriginal title. Justice Henry Baldwin spoke for the Court in Mitchel.
Baldwin was something less than a consistent supporter of Native American
rights; for example, in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, he stood alone in arguing
in favor of the right of the state of Georgia to assert sovereignty over the
Cherokee lands.7 7 In Mitchel, however, he asserted that, during the colonial
period, "friendly Indians were protected in the possession of the lands they
occupied, and were considered as owning them by a perpetual right of
possession in the tribe or nation inhabiting them . from generation to
generation ' 78 and that "their hunting grounds were as much in their actual
possession as the cleared fields of the whites. '79 Thus, Baldwin concluded,
"their right of occupancy is considered as sacred as the fee simple of the
whites,"8 and that "[t]he Indian right to the lands as property was not merely
of possession, that of alienation was concomitant."'"
With their emphasis on the legal significance of aboriginal title, Worcester
and Mitchel provide at least inferential support for the view that the
abrogation of aboriginal title gives rise to a Fifth Amendment claim for
compensation. By contrast, a series of decisions in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries might be seen as pointing in the opposite direction.
These decisions did not deal directly with the status of aboriginal title.
However, they reflect a vision of congressional authority over Indian affairs
that is virtually unfettered by extrinsic constitutional constraints.82
The most infamous of these decisions is Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.83 The
complex fact situation of Lone Wolf revolved around the Medicine Lodge
Treaty 1867, which provided that the heads of families of the Kiowa and
75. Id. at 761.
76. Id.
77. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 31-50 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
78. Mitchel, 34 U.S. at 745.
79. Id. at 746.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 758.
82. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (holding Congress has plenary
power to regulate conduct on Indian reservations).
83. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
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Comanche tribes could claim 320 acres from the common land of the
reservation as separate property, and provided further that reservation land
could not be ceded without the consent of three-fourths of the male adult
Indians occupying the land.84 Later, the Apache Tribe was brought under the
same regime." In 1892, 456 adult males signed a treaty ceding over two
million acres of reservation land in exchange for a payment of $2 million, to
be held in trust.8 6 The Indian agent certified that at the time, the three tribes
contained 562 male adults. 7  After Congress adopted implementing
legislation, members of the relevant tribe sought to void the agreement.88
They alleged that the count of eligible adult males was wrong, and that less
than three-quarters had in fact signed. 9 Moreover, they contended that the
signatures had been fraudulently obtained because the translator had misled
them regarding the amount that they would receive.90 Finally, they asserted
that the implementing legislation unlawfully changed the agreement that was
signed. Under these circumstances, the Indians argued that implementation
of the agreement would violate the Fifth Amendment by depriving them of a
property interest which was established by treaty.91
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the Indians' argument. Speaking
for the majority, Justice Edward White quoted at length from the Court's
earlier decision in United States v. Kagama92 and emphasized the plenary
authority of Congress over Indian affairs - even in the face of contrary treaty
language:
When... treaties were entered into between the United States and
a tribe of Indians it was never doubted that the power to abrogate
existed in Congress, and that in a contingency such power might be
availed of from considerations of governmental policy, particularly
if consistent with perfect good faith towards the Indians....
84. Id. at 554-55. For a detailed discussion of Lone Wolf, see generally Ann Laquer Estin,
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock: The Long Shadow, in THE AGGRESSIONS OFCIVILIZATION: FEDERAL
INDIAN POLICY SINCE THE 1880s, at 215-45 (Sandra L. Cadwalder & Vine Deloria eds., 1984).
85. Lone Wolf 187 U.S. at 559.
86. Id. at 555.
87. Id. at 554.
88. Id. at 560.
89. Id. at 561.
90. Id.
91. Id.





Congress [has full administrative power] over Indian tribal
property. In effect, the action of Congress now complained of was
but an exercise of such power, a mere change in the form of the
investment of Indian tribal property, the property of those who..
. were in substantial effect the wards of the government. We must
presume that Congress acted in perfect good faith in the dealings,
with the Indians of which complaint is made, and that the
legislative branch of the government exercised its bestjudgment in
the premises. In any event, as Congress possessed full power in
the matter, the judiciary cannot question or inquire into the motives
which prompted the enactment of this legislation.
93
While not directly addressing the issue of aboriginal title, the Lone Wolf
Court's emphasis on the prerogatives of Congress plainly did not bode well
for judicial protection of Indian land claims generally.9' Indeed, if anything,
one might have thought that the Lone Wolf plaintiffs stood on stronger legal
ground than subsequent parties who might seek to vindicate aboriginal title
per se. In Lone Wolf, the Native Americans could point to an agreement to
which the federal government had voluntarily acceded and which both parties
must have believed to have been legally binding." Nonetheless, the Court was
willing in effect to allow Congress to modify the agreement without the
consent of the Native American parties. Intuitively, one might well have
expected the Court to be even less hospitable to claims based solely on
common law principles that established the rights of preexisting occupants.
Subsequent caselaw, however, clearly revealed limits to Congressional
power under the Lone Wolf regime. In a series of decisions such as United
States v. Creek Nation96 and Shoshone Tribe of Indians v. United States,97 the
Court repeatedly and consistently held that the outright transfer of tribal lands
held under treaty required the government to pay compensation to the affected
tribes. These cases did not address the question of whether similar
compensation was required when aboriginal title was at stake. Nonetheless,
decided as they were against the background of the plenary power analysis of
Lone Wolf, they could plausibly be viewed as providing at least inferential
support for a right to compensation in the absence of treaties.
93. Id. at 566, 568 (quotations and citations omitted).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 554-56.
96. 295 U.S. 103 (1935).
97. 299 U.S. 476 (1937).
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For much of the twentieth century, jurisdictional barriers prevented the
assertion of claims for Native American compensation based on claims that
were not derived from treaty rights. In general, prior to 1946, the federal
courts were granted jurisdiction only to hear Indian land claims based on a
statute or treaty. By definition, the narrowness of this jurisdictional grant
excluded claims based on aboriginal title. However, the general grant of
jurisdictional authority was at times supplemented by statutes that expanded
jurisdiction in specific, narrowly defined circumstances. For example, in 1935,
Congress adopted a statute granting the Court of Claims authority to hear
cases involving "any and all legal and equitable claims arising under or
growing out of the original Indian title claim or rights" in lands described in
a number of unratified treaties dealing with land originally located in the
Oregon Territory.98 This statute laid the groundwork for United States v.
Alcea Band of Tillamooks9 (Tillamooks I), which ultimately found its way to
the Supreme Court in 1946.
The story of Tillamooks I began in 1850, when Congress authorized the
negotiation of treaties with Indian tribes in the Oregon Territory.'0° In 1855,
acting under the authority provided by this statute, the representatives of the
United States and the Alcea Tillamooks concluded an agreement whereby the
tribes agreed to cede much of their land in return for a cash payment and the
creation of a reservation.'"' The treaty was not self executing. 2 Anticipating
ratification, on November 9, 1855, President Franklin Pierce issued an
executive order creating a reservation for the Tillamooks whose dimensions
were substantially the same as those described in the treaty, and the
Tillamooks were almost immediately confined to the reservation.'0 3 The size
of the reservation was reduced by a new executive order in 186 5 .'04 An 1875
statute further reduced the reservation. 0 5 Finally, in 1894, Congress passed
a statute officially accepting and approving the reservation with the new
dimensions.' °6 However, the original treaty was never ratified, and the
Tillamooks did not receive the cash payment promised in the agreement.'
0 7
98. Act of Aug. 25, 1935, ch. 386, 49 Stat. 801.
99. 329 U.S. 40 (1946).





105. Id. at 43.
106. Id. at 43-44.




In their suit in the Court of Claims, the Tillamooks sought compensation for
being deprived of their land.'0 8 In addition to arguing that extinguishment of
aboriginal title by its terms constituted a cognizable taking under the Fifth
Amendment' 0 9, they relied on two statutory arguments. First, they asserted
that the 1935 statute creating jurisdiction in the Court of Claims implicitly
recognized aboriginal title as a compensable property interest. 0 Second, they
noted that the 1848 statute establishing a government for the Oregon Territory
provided that "nothing in this act shall be construed to impair the rights of
person or property now pertaining to the Indians in [the Oregon] Territory, so
long as such rights shall remain unextinguished by treaty between the United
States and such Indians.""'
After the Court of Claims ruled in favor of the Tillamooks, the government
appealed to the Supreme Court. With Justice Robert H. Jackson absent due
to his participation in the Nuremberg trials, the case was initially argued in
early 1946 before a Court of eight justices. At the initial conference, Chief
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone and Justices Stanley F. Reed, Wiley B. Rutledge
and Harold H. Burton voted to reverse the Court of Claims and reject the
claim for compensation, while Justices Felix Frankfurter, William 0. Douglas
and Frank Murphy supported the Tillamooks and Justice Hugo Lafayette
Black expressed some uncertainty about the proper resolution of the case.
However, Stone died suddenly before the case was finally resolved, and the
case was put over for re-argument. At the conference after the re-argument,
Frederick M. Vinson, Stone's replacement, announced his support for the
position of the Tillamooks. Black also took this view, creating a clear
majority in favor of compensation." 2
Vinson's plurality opinion is replete with language that might be seen as
supporting the view that the extinguishment of aboriginal title carries with it
an automatic right to compensation. He began by asserting that "[a]dmitting
the undoubted power of Congress to extinguish original Indian title compels
no conclusion that compensation need not be paid"' 3 that "[t]he Indians have
more than a mere moral claim for compensation,""' 4 and that denying the
claim of the Tillamooks would "ignore the plain import of traditional methods
108. Id.
109. Id. at 60.
110. Id. at57.
111. Id. at 42 (citing Act of Aug. 14, 1848, ch. 177, 9 Stat. 323).
112. This account is taken from the conference notes of Justice Wiley B. Rutledge, Box 152,
Wiley B. Rutledge Papers, Library of Congress.
113. Tillamooks 1, 329 U.S. at 47 (opinion of Vincent, C. J.).
114. Id.
No. 1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2004
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
of extinguishing original Indian title."' 5 In addition, he explicitly rejected a
rule that would allow recovery only in cases where Congress had formally
recognized the validity of the aboriginal title.' 6
However, Chief Justice Vinson stopped short of endorsing the principle that
all aboriginal title was protected by the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. While concluding that the jurisdictional statute did not convey
any substantive rights, he inferred a right to recovery from the protections that
had been provided by the 1848 statute. "7 Concurring, Justice Black - whose
vote was critical to the establishment of any binding rule in Tillamooks I -
was even more explicit. While arguing that right to compensation could be
derived from the jurisdictional statute, Black also asserted that:
"[b]efore Congress passed the special Act under which this suit was
brought, I think that the Government was under no more legal or
ethical obligation to pay these respondents than it was under
obligation to pay whatever descendants are left of the numerous
other tribes whose lands and homes have been taken from them
since the Nation was founded.""' 8
The Court clarified the import of its decision in Tillamooks I when United
States v. Tillamooks"9 (Tillamooks I1) returned to the Court five years later.
On remand from Tillamooks I, the Court of Claims had awarded the tribe
$3,000,000 plus interest from the date of the taking. The government
appealed from the award of interest, noting that interest was only appropriate
if the damage award was founded on the Fifth Amendment and contending
that the original decision had been based instead on statutory authority. In a
brief, per curiam opinion the Court accepted the government's argument,
observing that "[1]ooking to the former opinions in this case, we find that
none of them expressed the view that recovery was grounded on a taking
under the Fifth Amendment."' 120 Thus, when Tee-Hit-Ton121 came before the
Court in 1955, the constitutional status of aboriginal title remained uncertain.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 48-50.
117. Id. at49.
118. Id. at 54 (Black, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
119. 341 U.S. 48 (1951) (per curiam).
120. Id. at 49. This conclusion had been foreshadowed by Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co.,
337 U.S. 86, 106 n.28 (1949).
121. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
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In Tee-Hit-Ton, a clan of Tlinglit Indians sought compensation after the
Secretary of Agriculture authorized the sale of timber from the Tongass
National Forest in Alaska. The Court of Claims found that, at the time that
the United States acquired Alaska from Russia in 1867, the Tee-Hit-Tons
possessed aboriginal title to the land on which the timber was located. The
Tee-Hit-Tons argued that their title had been recognized by an 1884 statute
organizing the Alaska Territory,'22 but that even if their title had not been
officially recognized, they were entitled to compensation because the sale of
the timber effected a partial taking of their preexisting property rights. The
procedural barriers to the suit had been removed by the waiver of sovereign
immunity in the Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946. Nonetheless, a six-
justice majority not only held that the 1884 statute had not recognized any
rights in the Tee-Hit-Ton, but also rejected the Tee-Hit-Ton's claim based on
aboriginal title.
Justice Stanley Reed, who had dissented in Tillamooks I,2 spoke for the
Court in Tee-Hit-Ton. Reed asserted that aboriginal title "is not a property
right but amounts to a right of occupancy which the sovereign grants and
protects against intrusion by third parties but which right of occupancy may
be terminated and such lands fully disposed of by the sovereign itself without
any legally enforceable obligation to compensate the Indians."'' 2 4 After
reviewing the caselaw, he stated flatly that "Indian occupation of land without
government recognition of ownership creates no rights against taking or
extinction by the United States protected by the Fifth Amendment or any
other principle of law."' 125 Reed was apparently deaf to the eerie similarities
between this conclusion and Roger Brooke Taney's infamous claim that, at
the time the Constitution was drafted, free African-Americans "had no rights
that the white man was bound to respect. "126
Against this background, the contrast between Brown and Tee-Hit-Ton
could not be more stark. In Brown, the Court rejected deeply ingrained legal
traditions that had contributed to the subjugation of African-Americans; in
Tee-Hit-Ton, the Court reinforced the elements of the legal regime that
contributed to the decimation of Native American culture. Brown paved the
way for an improvement in the opportunities available to African-Americans;
Tee-Hit-Ton denied recompense to Native Americans for economic injuries.
122. Act of May 17, 1884, ch. 53, 23 Stat. 24.
123. Tillamooks 1, 329 U.S. at 55-64 (Reed, J., dissenting).
124. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 279.
125. Id. at 285.
126. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (1 How.) 393, 407 (1857).
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The question thus becomes why the Court vindicated the interests of African-
Americans while treating the claims of Native Americans so cavalierly.
IlL Understanding the Dynamic of Brown and Tee-Hit-Ton
The respective decisions in Brown and Tee-Hit-Ton reflect the influence
to two different types of forces. The first is that of distinctively legal
principles - formal legal analysis. The second is that of the more general
political environment. Each of these forces played a significant role in
generating the disparate results in Brown and Tee-Hit-Ton.
Formal differences between the two cases were a necessary but not
sufficient condition for the Court's disparate conclusions in Brown and Tee-
Hit-Ton. The two cases involved quite different claims of right, derived from
quite different sources. Brown was an Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection claim that was based solely on the positive authority of the
Constitution itself. In Tee-Hit-Ton, by contrast, the source of the
constitutional claim was the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Moreover, although all Native Americans had been made citizens of the
United States by statute in 1925, the argument of the plaintiffs was ultimately
based on a property interest that was not created by the Constitution, but
instead allegedly existed even before the first Europeans settled what was to
become the United States.
However, only the most naive observer would suggest that the Court was
moved entirely or even primarily by formal considerations in Brown and Tee-
Hit-Ton. Indeed, if one were to focus only on formal concerns, he could
argue persuasively that the Native Americans in Tee-Hit-Ton had a much
stronger constitutional claim than the children in Brown. Despite their
ultimate support for the result, Justices Felix Frankfurter and Robert Jackson
apparently believed that Brown could not plausibly be viewed as reflecting
any "neutral" principle of constitutional law.127 Obviously, the decision was
inconsistent with existing precedent. In addition, it was based on a view of
the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment that was
questionable at best. By contrast, the commentators who have addressed the
issue have often concluded that Johnson, Worcester and Michel strongly
suggested that the Native Americans claimants were entitled to compensation
in Tee-Hit-Ton.'28
127. KLARMAN, supra note 27, at 295-96.
128. E.g., Newton, supra note 5, at 1217; Singer, supra note 4, at 519-27.
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The difference between the treatment of Brown and Tee-Hit-Ton is more
plausibly explained by reference to the political dynamic of the mid-1950s.
Beginning with the presidential election of 1936, the African-American vote
had been an important element of the coalition that brought victories to
Democrats Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman, who in turn
appointed almost all of the justices who decided both cases. Moreover, by
1954, the issue of racial segregation had become an important issue in
national politics. Indeed, Truman's decision to desegregate the military in
1946 had split the Democratic party along regional lines, leading to the
formation of a short-lived "Dixiecrat" party that nominated Strom Thurmond
for president in 1948 on an avowedly segregationist platform. With
Thurmond depriving him of the electoral votes of five normally Democratic
Southern states, Truman only defeated Thomas Dewey because of
overwhelming support from African-Americans in the North. Although the
Democratic party reunited in 1952, the issue of segregation and civil rights
generally remained a high-profile issue, with African-Americans having the
support of a number of important political constituencies in the North. 29
The situation of Native Americans was quite different. With a population
of only 357,000 in 1950, Native Americans had no substantial impact on the
political process, and few influential allies in the white community. The
disparity in political influence is illustrated dramatically by the briefs filed in
Brown and Tee-Hit-Ton. The position of the African-American plaintiffs was
supported not only by the United States government, but also by amicus briefs
filed by groups as disparate as the American Jewish Congress, the American
Civil Liberties Union, the American Federation of Teachers, the Congress of
Industrial Organizations, and the American Veterans Committee. 130 By
contrast, the only amicus briefs filed in Tee-Hit-Ton came from state
attorneys-general who were opposed the Native American claimants. 3'
The widespread support enjoyed by the plaintiffs in Brown and its progeny
also reflected a more basic aspect of the American political self-image. From
much of the nation's history, the treatment of African-Americans in the South
had been condemned by important figures in the North as a regional
aberration that was inconsistent with the basic values embodied in the
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. 132 Segregation in
129. KLARMAN, supra note 27, at 180-8 1.
130. Brown, 347 U.S. at 496.
131. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 273.
132. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 579-80 (1872) (remarks of Sen. Sumner);
15 ANNALS OF CONG. 1179-84 (1819) (remarks of Rep. Fuller).
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particular was seen as an affront to the basic principles of equality embodied
in the Reconstruction amendments (whatever the original understanding of
those amendments might have been), as well as an embarrassment to a nation
that was attempting to present itself to the Cold War world as the paragon of
freedom, justice, opportunity and equality.'33 From this perspective, the
decision in Brown did nothing more than remove an anomaly that was a stain
on the national character.
Conversely, a victory for the plaintiffs in Tee-Hit-Ton would have been
inconsistent with the image of America as a nation with a deep historical
commitment to justice. The treatment of the Tee-Hit-Tons by the federal
government could not be dismissed as a isolated phenomenon. Instead, in
substantial measure, the nation owed its very existence to analogous actions.
Thus, in Tee-Hit-Ton, in his majority opinion, Justice Reed observed that
[elvery American schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of this
continent were deprived of their ancestral ranges by force, and
that, even when the Indians ceded millions of acres by treaty in
return for blankets, food and trinkets, it was not a sale but the
conqueror's will that deprived them of their land.'34
While some scholars have disputed this characterization of the process by
which the United States acquired tribal lands, '35 the belief that the government
had acquired vast amounts of Indian territory by force or fraud provides the
backdrop for the Court's decision in Tee-Hit-Ton.
Given these assumptions, the actions of the United States government and
its citizenry were justified by the widespread view that they were bringing
civilization to a land that, despite the presence of Native Americans, was in
a very real sense unclaimed. In 1945, Justice Jackson captured the essence of
this view in his concurring opinion in Northwestern Band of Shoshone Indians
v. United States: 13
6
133. For a detailed analysis of the interaction between the Cold War struggle and the issue
of segregation, see MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000).
134. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. at 289-90.
135. David E. Wilkins argues that the uncompensated seizure of Indian lands had generally
rested at least formally on a process of negotiation and voluntary exchange, and that the Court
should have honored this tradition by requiring the payment of compensation in Tee-Hit-Ton.
DAVID E. WuiINs, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE SUPREME COURT: THE MASKING
OFJUSTICE 179 (1997). Joseph W. Singer takes a similar view. Singer, supra note 4, at 525-27.




The Indian parties to this treaty were a band of simple, relatively
peaceful, and extremely primitive men.... The Indian parties did
not know what titles were, had no such concept as that of
individual title, and had no sense of property in land ...
Ownership meant no more to them than to roam the land as a great
common, and to possess and enjoy it in the same way that they
possessed and enjoyed sunlight and the west wind and the feel of
spring in the air.' 37
Under this view, the white settlers and their government could plausibly claim
that they had not done anything fundamentally wrong in asserting ownership
over territory that Native Americans had previously seen as their homeland.
Of course, the government was still bound to honor its agreements, and might
also be viewed as having some moral obligation toward Native Americans.
However, the government could still argue that it had not deprived Native
Americans of any right that was seen as truly fundamental in the Anglo-
American tradition.
This position, however, could not survive a holding that the abrogation of
aboriginal title per se gave rise to a claim of constitutional magnitude. Such
a holding would have decisively labeled the displacement of Native American
claims as a massive, unjust expropriation of property - a particularly striking
example of what today we would describe as ethnic cleansing. This
conclusion fits at best uneasily with the concept of a nation that purports to
be founded upon principles of law and justice.
Viewed against this background, Brown and Tee-Hit-Ton can be seen as
complimentary rather than conflicting. On one hand, the Brown Court sought
to eliminate practices that the dominant political faction viewed as
aberrational and inconsistent with basic American principles of equality and
justice. On the other, Tee-Hit-Ton minimized the import of the injustices
inherent in the process by which the nation was established. Thus, in both
cases, the decisions of the Court worked to bolster and reinforce the image
that Americans had of themselves and sought to project to the world at large
in the mid-1950s.
Conclusion
Any number of important lessons can be drawn from Brown and Tee-Hit-
Ton. First, taken together, the cases illustrate the complexity of racial issues
137. Id. at 356-57 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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in America. Both cases involved the claims of racial minority groups. Both
groups had suffered grievously at the hands of the dominant whites.
However, the two groups had quite different relationships with the white
power structure, and the ultimate decisions in the two cases reflected the
influence of these differences.
More generally, taken together, the two decisions reveal the flaws in the
most common justification for judicial activism that does not reflect the
original understanding of the Constitution. Many commentators have
justified such activism on the ground that judges are institutionally well
positioned to make dispassionate assessments of the merits of fundamental
moral arguments. Thus, for example, Owen Fiss argues thatjudges search for
what is "true, right and just,"' 38 and Ronald Dworkin contends that
nonoriginalist judicial review "insures that the most fundamental issues of
political morality will finally be set out and debated as issues of principle and
not simply as issues of political power, a transformation that cannot succeed,
in any case not fully, within the legislature itself." '139 The decision in Brown
is often seen as one of the quintessential example of the operation of this
process.
When juxtaposed with Tee-Hit-Ton, however, Brown emerges in a quite
different light. Without question, racial segregation was and is fundamentally
wrong, and the elimination of segregated schools was a vindication of an
important moral principle. However, the moral claim of the Brown plaintiffs
was certainly no stronger than that of the Native Americans whose land was
expropriated without even the shadow of consent. Against this background,
the result in Brown cannot be seen as reflecting special judicial competence
in dealing with basic moral questions. Rather, it must be seen as the result of
a historical fortuity that created a Court that was dominated by adherents to
Northern, liberal ideology on racial issues. We can and should celebrate the
result of this fortuity; however, we should not overstate its significance for the
justification of judicial review more generally.
138. Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10 (1979).
139. Ronald M. Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469,517-18 (1981).
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